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Abstract  Pension  funds  worldwide,  for  instance  in the  UK and the  Netherlands,  wil I
increasingly  adopt  the  fair  value approach.  The  aim  of this  paper  is to  derive  an  integral
risk  management  framework  for  pension  funds,  based  on fair  value  principles.  The  point
of reference  is a typical  defined  benefit  plan  with  indexed  liabilities,  where  the  main
sources  of risk  are the  long-term  fluctuations  in prices  driving  the  value  of the  plan's
assets  and  the  fluctuations  in the  discount  and  inflation  rates  that  determine  the  value  of
the liabilities.  Mismatch  risk  is identified  as the  central  risk  measure  for  integral  risk
management.  The fair  value  approach  contributes  in clarifying  the  long-term  advantages
of a pension  fund  scheme;  however,  the  approach  also  contributes  in revealing  its main
weakness:  a high  exposure  to  mismatch  risk  and  hence  a large  risk  of underfunding  in the
short term.  A typical  pension  fund  usually  fails  to  be  explicit  on the  issue  of risk bearing.
Therefore,  it is  not clear  which  of the  stakeholders  has to  meet  up a funding  shortage.
Three  options  to  handle  short-term  risk  are discussed.  First,  creating  a floor  by investing
substantially  in index-linked  bonds.  Secondly,  holding  a high  solvency  margin  to  absorb  a
fall  in  asset  prices.  The third  option,  preferred  by the  authors,  is to  state  the  so-called
pension  deal  so  that  it is clear  which  of the  stakeholders  is participating  in the  risk  of
underfunding  as weil  as overfunding,  and  to  what  extent.  Such  a deal  will  assist  in
preventing  potential  conflicts  between  the  stakeholders  about  the  allocation  of benefits
and casts.  The  pension  fund  management  and  its stakeholders  wil I only  obtain  good
insight  into  the  benefits  and  casts  if the  pension  fund  contract  is a transparent  and
complete  contract.  Fair value  principles  contribute  to  these  goals  of transparency  and
completeness.
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actuarial  discount rate. Risk  is ignored  or  The  long-run  benefits  in  risk
disguised. Actually,  the  actuarial  approach  reduction  and risk  sharing stimulate
leads to  a self-constructed  picture  of the  pension funds to  aim  for  long-term
fmancial  solidity  of a pension fund  objectives  in  their  investment  policy.
without  any link  to  fmancial markets.  However,  risk management in  the  short
The  fair value  approach implies  term  remains important.  A  pension fund
market-based  valuation  of assets  and  may always get involved  in  a situation  of
liabilities  so the balance sheet reHects  discontinuity,  which  can be the  result  for
true  economic  values. Furthermore,  instance of  bankruptcy  of the  sponsoring
information  on fmancial  markets is used  company,  or  of mergers and takeovers.
to  arrive  at an explicit  analysis of the  risk  Also  the  generational perspective is  of
position  of a pension fund.  It  also  importance.  A  fund  with  a serious
enables short-term  and long-term  policy  funding  shortage will  not  be attractive  to
questions to  be analysed within  one  rOting  workers,  because they  know  in
single framework.  In  other  words,  the  advance that the scheme will  harm  their
fair value  approach enables integral  risk  net lifetime  income.  A  serious funding
management.  gap bas to  be solved by  high
The  concept  of  'mismatch  risk'  is the  contributions  over a long  period,  so the
central  risk measure in  the  fair value  present value  of contributions  to  be paid
approach.  Mismatch  risk is defmed as the  will  be  in  excess of present value  of
standard deviation  of the  so-called 'excess  benefits to  be received.
return'.  By  'excess return'  is meant the  This  paper will  discuss  three options  to
difference  between  the  return  on  assets  handle the  high exposure to  risk of short
and the  return  on the liabilities.  There  is  term underfunding.  First, creating a Hoor
a trade-off  between  excess return  and  by investing  substantially in index-linked
mismatch risk.  A  higher  expected excess  bonds. The  importance  of inflation-linked
return  can only  be realised by  accepting  honds for  pension fund  risk management
more  mismatch risk.  The  authors put  is demonstrated. However,  there is a very
forward  that mismatch  risk in  the  long  limited  supply of these kinds  of bonds.
run  is lower  than in  the  short run.  There  Hence,  govemments  in Europe  and
are two  reasons for  this.  First, stocks  elsewhere should be encouraged to issue
have been characterised by  mean  (more) index-linked  bonds. A second war
reversion.  Mean  reversion implies  that  is to  hold  a high  solvency margin in  order
the  average risk  on an annual basis  to  absorb a fall  in  asset  prices. However,  it
decreases  when  the  investment  period  is  is very  difficult  to restore a surplus
extended.  Secondly, in  the  long  run  a  position  when  the pension fund  bas been
positive  correlation  can be observed  hit  by a severe fall in  asset  prices. This
between  return  on assets  and return  on  will  imply  high costs in  terrns of
liabilities.  In  the  short  term  there  is no  additional  contributions  by the  sponsor
such correlation.  and/or  a reduction  in defmed benefits.
A  pension fund  bas a very  long  The  third  war  is to frame an explicit
investment  horizon  (in  fact indefmite)  contract between  stakeholders on the
and is therefore  in  an excellent  position  issue: which  of the stakeholders, and to
to  benefit  from  a decline  of the  what  extent, are participating  in the  risk
mismatch  risk  in time.  An  important  of underfunding  as well  as overfunding?
aspect of  Dutch  pension funds is  Such a contract is called a pension deal.
risk-sharing between  generations, so they  The  preferences ofthose  stakeholders who
are able to  spread risk  in time.  are ultimately  hearing the  funding  risk
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determine  the exposure of mismatch risk  entirely  of indexed  bonds. The
and the  degree of funding  of the scheme.  characteristics of this  mix  are that the
The  structure  of this  paper is as  expected rate  of  return  on  assets  is
foilows.  It  flrst  looks  at the  concept  of  always equal to  the  rate of  return  on
mismatch risk.  Next  it  discusses  liabilities,  so that the  excess return,  as
return-risk  trade-offs,  which  occur  in the  weil  as the  mismatch risk,  is nil.
capital market,  with  a distinction  being  Addition  of  regular honds and stocks to
made between  the  short-run  and the  the portfolio  results in  an increase of the
long-run.  Taking  a simple case as an  expected  return  on  investment,  so that  it
example,  it  is shown  that the  long-run  is to  be expected that a lower
orientation  of the  investment  policy  leads  contribution  level  wiil  become  possible,
to  an improvement  of the trade-off  but  at a higher  mismatch risk.
between  return  and mismatch risk in
comparison  with  the  short-run.  The
long-run  benefits stimulate  pension funds  Return  and  risk  in  the  short  and
to  aim  for  long-term  objectives  in  their  the  long  run
investment  policy.  However,  risk  Risk  analyses  and ALM  studies
management in  the  short term remains  performed  by  pension funds are aften
important.  Fina11y,  three  options  are  based on the  assumptions of  constant
discussed to  control  the  short-term  expected  returns,  constant risks and
solvency position.  constant correlations.  An  important
implication  of these assumptions is that
the  optimal  mix  for  a one-year period  is
Trade-off  between  excess  return  equal to  the  optimal  mix  taken for  a
and  mismatch  risk  multi-year  period.  In  other words,  the
The  fmancing  of  pensions is based on  optimal  asset  a11ocation  is the  same for
funding.  Pension pro mises to  the  the  short and long  term.
participants have to  be fulfilled  by
building  up  sufficient  capital Erom
contributions  and investment  returns.  Return
Higher  returns  imply  less contribution,  Ample  literature  bas by  now  become
and the  other  war  round.  available in which,  in  the  authors'
The  primary  objective  of  a pension  opinion,  it  is  convincingly  demonstrated
fund  is to  fulfill  the  pension promises at  that  return  levels which  vary  in  time  and
the  lowest  possible contribution  rate with  which,  given  a sufficiendy  long  horizon,
an acceptable level  of risk.  In  fact this  are predictabie  to  a certain  extent  on  the
involves  a trade-off  between  the  basis of  valuation  ratios, must be  dealt
expected excess return  on the  one hand  with.1
and the  exposure to  mismatch risk  on
the  other  hand. Excess return  is defined
simply as the  difference  between  the  Risk
return  on  assets  and the  return  on  The  length  of the  horizon  is a significant
liabilities.  Mismatch  risk is defmed as the  factor  for the  risk profile  of  the various
uncertainty  around  the  excess  return.  asset  categories. The  risk attaching  to  a
The  fund  may decide to  construct the  one-year horizon  need  not  be equal to
so-ca11ed  perfect hedge portfolio.  In the  the  annualised risk attaching to  a
case of index-linked  pension rights this  multi-year  horizon.
perfect hedge portfolio  will  be made up  The  results of empirical  studies
,
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;'  indicate  that  long-tenn  returns  on  volatility  of inflation,  which  makes it
f  investments in  equities are characterised  difficult  to  test for  correlation  between
!  by  mean reversion.  With  mean  reversion  stock returns and inflation.  In  addition,
, ,.  the  annual returns  on  equity  investments  there  is the  problem  that  in  the  past the
fluctuate  -with  a certain  degree of  inflation  process has manifested itself as a
correlation  (serial correlation)  -around  series of  inflation  regimes which  all have
a long-tenn  average. This  means that the  their  own  average level and volatility.
annualised risk  in the  case of  equity  However,  if persistence in  the  inflation
investments can be assessed  to  be lower  process is assumed and taken  into
whenever  a langer  investment  horizon  is  account,  then the  correlation  between
opted  faro However,  there  are also  inflation  and shares in  the  long  tenn  does
I  economists and actuaries who  state that  become  clearer. The  higher  the  inflation
I  the  evidence  on  mean reversion depends  persistence, the  better  the performance  of
I  very  much  on the  chosen time  period  stocks as a hedge against inflation.2
I  and the  markets under consideration.  With  respect to  nominal  bands and
I.  In  ~he case of  in:v~s~ent  in  in~e~ed liabilities,  a po~itiv~  corre~tion
.I  fixed-Income  secuntIes lt  appears, by  Wlthin  a long-tenn  settIng IS plauslble  as ,
I.  contrast, that the  annualised long-tenn  weil.  Movements  in  the  real rate of
I  risk is  higher  than the  short-tenn  risk.  interest will  affect bath  bands and ,
I.  This  phenomenon  is referred to  as  liabilities.  This  is in  particular  the  case in
I  mean-averting.  The  increase in  time  of  a low-inflation  environment.
I  the  risk  on fIXed-income  securities is to  Market-based  valuation  of indexed
,  be attributed  to  the  risk attached to  pension  rights is clone on the basis of the
I  reinvestment  of  interest and principal.  real rate of interest. The  nominal  rate  of
I  The  recognition  of  time-variation  in  risk  interest is composed  of the  expected real
I  should  be reflected  in  time-variation  of  rate  of  interest and the  expected rate  of
I  optimal  portfolios.  inflation.  The  positive  correlation
r  between  the  nominal  and the  real rate  of
!  . willb d .  r  Interest  e more  pronounce  In an
r  Correlation  econoinic  regime  with  a low  level  of
I  The  correlation  between changes in the  inflation  than  in  an environment  with  a
I  value  of  assets  and changes in  the value  high  level of  inflation.  In  a high-inflation
t.  of liabilities  is  of much  significance to  environment  the  effect of the  inflation
\. I\.  the  mismatch  risk for  a pension fund.  volatility  will  be .dominant  in  relation  to
Where  the  long  tenn  is concerned,  a  the  real interest rate effect.
,  positive  correlation  is plausible.  First of  For  the  short  tenn,  any  relationship
t.  all, stocks will  provide  a long-tenn  between  stocks and  nominal  wage
I!  hedge  for  (wage) inflation.  The  future  growth  will  be  absent. Bonds  still  may
stream of  nominal  dividends  is one  of  provide  a  hedge  in  a  low-inflation
~  the  driving  farces of  stock valuation.  The  environment,  due  to  the  co-movement
I  growth  of the liabilities  as a result of  in  the  real  and  nominal  rate  of
I  indexation  will  then  in the  long  tenn  be  interest.  A  pension  fund  with  a  heavy
partially  matched  by the  upward  investment  in  bands  will  be  very
revaluation  of stocks. Empirically,  the  vulnerable  for  a  switch  from  a
inflation  hedge qualities  of shares in the  low-inflation  to  a  high-inflation
long  tenn  are difficult  to  prove.  Two  environment.  The  inflation  expectations
reasons can be given  for  this.  Volatility  of  go  up,  nominal  rate  of  interest  will  rise
stock returns  is much  higher  than the  and  so  there  is  a  low  or  even  negative
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Table 1:  Assumptions  relating to return, risk and correlation: Short term and long term
(Iow-inflation  environment)
Correlation  Matrix  Bonds
Short term  Mean  stocks  long  Liabilities
Stocks  1
Long-term  bonds  0,2
Liabilities return  0
Wage inflation
Price inflation
'.  Cotf$.lation  ~atrix  Bond$'
Long  term  Mean;;".  Risk  stocks  long  Liabilities
Stocks  8.0  12.0  1
Long-term  bands  5.0  10.0  0.2  1
Liabilities return  6.0  9.0  0.3  0.3  1
Wage inflation  3.0  2.0  --+ P.. ti .
20 15 rlce In atlon  + c
total  rate  of  return  on  bonds.  The  case. This  case is a highly  stylised outline
value  of  indexed  liabilities  will  go  up  of  the  reality  in  order to  highlight  the
because of  higher  indexation.  major points.  A  higher  degree of  reality
is possible of  course, but  this would  only
make the  case more  complex,  without
Conclusion  leading  to  fundamentally  different
In  short,  Erom the above the  authors  insights.
conclude  flrst  that the  optimal  equity  Assume  that  a  specmc  pension  fund
allocation  for  a long-term  investor  such  has formulated  its  expectations  for  the
as a pension fund  will  be higher  than  for  future,  as has been  set  out  in  Table  1.
a short-term  investor.  Stocks do  These  assumptions reflect  the  current
mean-revert  whereas bands mean-avert.  environment  for  pension  funds.  A
The  longer  the  horizon,  the  more  stocks  distinction  is  made  between  the  short
becorne less risky, whereas bonds  will  and  the  long  term  and  the  shading  in
becorne more  risky.  the  table  indicates  the  changes for  the
Furthermore,  in  the  long  term  a  long  term  in  comparison  with  the
positive  correlation  between  assets  and  short  term.
liabilities  can be 'expected. This  leads to
a reduction  of the  annualised mismatch
risk and tros reduction  increases with  the  Expected  values
horizon.  As aresult,  the  trade-off  A  low-inflation  environment  is assumed.
between  excess return  and, respectively,  The  expected wage and price  inflation
contribution  rate  on the  one hand and  are 3  per cent and 2  per  cent,
mismatch  risk  on the  other,  will  improve  respectively. Return  on  long-term  bands
in the  longer  run.  These flIldings  will  be  is set at 5 per cent. The  expected  return
illustrated  in  the  following  with  a simple  on  equity  is 8  per cent, so the  equity
risk premium  is equal to  3  per  cent.3
Liabilities,  L, have an expected  growth
rate RL  of 6  per  cent, which  is based on
Strategic  investment  portfolio  an expected wage  inflation  rate  of 3  per
What  bas been put  forward  in  the  cent and an expected real rate  of  interest
foregoing  can be illustrated  with  a simple  of  3  per cent.
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Table  2:  Excess  return  and  mismatch  risk  in  the  short  and  the  long  term
J  '  Mismatch  risk  M.ismatch  risk
I.  Mixbonds/stocks  RA  tRL  RA-  RI.  short term  long  term
c
! 100/0  5.0  6.0  -1.0  12..0  11.3
(  90/10  5.3  6.0  -0.7  11:8  10.8
'I  80/20  5.6  6.0  -0.4  11.8  10.5
~  70/30  5.9  6.0  -0.1  12.0  10.4
ti  60/40  6.2  6.0  0.2  12.3  10.3
I  50/50  6.5  6.0  0.5  12.9  10.4
I  40/60  6.8  6.0  0.8  13.6  10.6
,  30/70  7..1  6.0  1.1  14.4  10.9
I1  20/80  7.4  6.0  1.4  15.3  11.4
10/90  7.7  6.0  1..7  16.4  12.0
0/100  8.0  6.0  2.0  17.5  12.7
"
Risk  has here  been  put  at  9  per  cent.4
The  risk  per  category  is  given  in  temlS  It  should  be  noted  that  for  the  short
of  standard deviations.  For  the  asset  teml  a  low  correlation  is  assumed I categories  a  higher  risk  brings  the  between  bands  and  liabilities,  reflecting ,  prospect  of  a  higher  expected  return.  that  in  a  low-inflation  environment
A  distinction  has been  made  between  bands  and  liabilities  are  bath  affected
,  equity  risk  in  the  short  and  in  the  by  movements  in  the  rea!  rate  of
I  lon~  te~.  The  .annualised risk  on  inter~st.  For  the  long  teml:  stocks
.Co  equ1ty  1S  lower  m  the  long  teml  than  proVlde  a  hedge  for  wage-mdexed
in  the  short  teml  because of  mean  liabilities.
reversion.  The  risk  on  equity  in  the  Table  2  below  shows  the  relation  .'~
long  teml  is  assumed to  be  equa!  to  between  the  asset mix,  the  level  of  ;thf
12  per  cent,  while  in  the  short  teml  it  returns  on  invested  capita!  RA,  the
is  18  per  cent.  The  reinvestment  risk  liability  return  RL  and  the  excess
of  bands  results in  an  increase  of  the  return  (RA -RL),  and  mismatch  risk  in
risk  in  the  long  teml  fiom  8  per  cent  the  short  and  in  the  long  teml.  Figure
to  10  per  cent.  1  shows  the  trade-offs  ('efficient  sets')
The  volatility  of  the  liabilities  can  be  between  excess return  and  mismatch
traced  back  to  the  volatility  of  the  rea!  risk  for  the  short  teml  and  for  the
rate  of  interest  and  the  wage  inflation.  long  teml.  From  tms  figure  it  can  be
The  pension  liabilities  may  relate  to  seen at  a  glance  that  a  long-teml
benefits  that  win  become  payable  in  orientation  of  the  investment  policy
the  distant  future  (say within  the  results in  an  improvement  of  the
period  of  the  next  80  years). The  trade-off  between  return  on  the  one
weighted  average duration  of  the  hand  and  mismatch  risk  on  the  other.
pension  rights  in  the  case of  a  typica!  It  may be noted  that a pension fund
pension  fund  is  of  the  order  of  15  to  has a huge  exposure to  mismatch risk,
20  years.  That  is  why  relatively  small  even with  a  100 per  cent mix  of
movements  in  the  rea! rate  of  interest  nomina!  bonds.  Furthemlore,  this simple
and  wage  inflation  may  have  a  case with  realistic  assumptions shows very
relatively  heavy  impact  on  the  clearly  that a pension fund  with  indexed
provision  for  pension  liabilities.  The  benefits needs to  invest quite  heavily  in
standard  deviation  of  this  liability  return  equities  (at least 40  per cent) to  have a
is  consequendy  relatively  high  and  it  prospect of a positive  excess  return.
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1-  short  tenn  -.-long  tennl
Figure  1:  Trade-off  between  return  and  rnisrnatch  risk
Solvency  improve  considerably  the  risk
A  pension fund  cannot avoid  mismatch  management practice  of  pension  funds.
risk and is therefore  exposed to  solvency  These  bands  provide  a hedge  for  the
risk  that  may lead to  a situation  of  indexed  pension  liabilities,  so  they
serious underfunding.  Traditionally,  in  the  reduce  the  mismatch  risk  of  the  fund.
Netherlands  the  pension laws and the  Figure  2  shows  the  potential  of  ILB
regulating  authorities have focused on  for  pension  fund  risk  management.
the  short-term  solvency position.5 A  fund  Two  types  of  ILB  are  distinguished,  the
is seen as solvent if  its capital is at all  so-called  wage-indexed  bands  and  the
times  sufficient to  allow  a transfer of the  price-indexed  bonds.  The  return  on
liabilities  to  a third  party, for instance to  price-indexed  bands  is the  sum  of  the
another  pension fund  in the  event of a  real  coupon  plus  the  actual
merger  or a takeover, or to  an insurance  price-infiation.  It  is  assumed that  the
(or  reinsurance) company. The  solvency  expected  return  on  price-indexed  bands
situation  may be controUed by  investing  is  equal  to  the  expected  retum  on
substantially in index-linked  bands or  by  regular  bonds.  Also  the  expected  retum
aiming  at holding  a large funding  surplus  on  wage-indexed  bands  also is  set
position.  However,  these two  solutions  equal  to  the  expected  retum  on  regular
are hampered  by serious problems.  bonds.  Wage  growth  can  be
Therefore  the framing  of an explicit  decomposed  in  real  growth  plus
pension deal is proposed as a third  war.  price-inflation.  Therefore,  the  real
coupon  of  the  wage-indexed  bands  bas
to  be  lower  than  the  real  coupon  of
Option  I: Index-linked  bonds  price-indexed  bands  in  order  to
Index-linked  bands  (ILB)  were  not  warrant  that  the  expected  nominal
included  in  the  preceding  analysis. It  is  returns  on  the  different  types  of  bands
a weU  known  result  that  a large  are  all  equal.  A  very  important
availability  of  index-linked  bands  wi11  characteristic  of  wage-indexed  bands  is
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RA-RL  1100%  equities  I
A
-4--1  Efficient set  long ten»  I
CT  mismatch
~  00% wage-  100% price-  I  100%  regular  I
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Figure  2:  Efficient  sets
that  the  offered  return  matches the  wage-indexed  honds  and  equities  are
return  on  wage-indexed  liabilities,  so  a  superior  to  combinations  of
pension  fund  with  an  asset mix  price-indexed  honds  and  equities  and
composed  of  100  per  cent  also  superior  to  combinations  of  regular
wage-indexed  honds  is  free  of  honds  and  equities.
mismatch  risk.  When  the  asset mix  is  The  risk-reducing  capacity of index
composed  of  price-indexed  honds,  then  linked  honds  (ILB)  clarifies  how
mismatch  risk  wil1  also be  reduced  important  it  is that more  of these assets
considerably,  but  not  completely  are issued. This  wil1 contribute  to  the
because these honds  provide  no  hedge  sustainability of funded  defined  benefit
against rea! wage  growth  volatility.  plans. In  many countries  in  Europe,
Apart  Erom the  efficient  set  consisting  governments  consider the  transition  Erom
of  regular  honds  and  equities,  we  can  pay-as-you-go  pensions to  funded
distinguish  an  efficient  set with  pensions, primarily  defmed  contribution
price-indexed  honds  and  equities  and  plans. ILB  wil1 also be  of considerable
an  efficient  set with  wage-indexed  significance  for  defined  contributions
honds  and  equities.  It  is  plausible  to  plans in  order to  reduce the  investment
assume that  the  objective  function  of  a  risk  in the  retirement  period  and the
pension  fund  is  positively  related  to  the  pre-retirement  plans.
term  excess return  and  negatively  to  However,  the world  market  of
the  term  mismatch  risk.  Figure  2  then  index-linked  assets  is too  small to  be  of
shows  that  combinations  of  rea! interest for  pension plans. Table 3
;
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Table  3:  Comparison  assets  pension  funds  and  large  inflation-indexed  bands  markets
Inflation-indexed  markets  ($USbn)  Pension  fund  capital  ($USbn)
..
Canada  11  Netherlands  440
France  19  UK  1261
Sweden  12  USA  8078
UK  103  Canada  607
US  133  Japan  1926
Total  278
February  2002  Ultimo  2000
Source:  Barclays  Capital  Source:  Pensions  &  Investments
shows that the  world  marker  size of  myopic  investment  policy  will  entail
inflation-indexed  bands  amounts to  more  negative effects. So far  in  this  paper it
or less US$270bn  in  May 2001.  The  size  has been  shown  that  pension funds have
of the  pension funds  in the  Netherlands  to  accept high  exposure of  mismatch  risk
already amount  to  more  than US$400bn  in  order to  realise at least a positive
in  spring 2002.  excess  return.  This  is a necessary
condition  for  the  growth  rare of  assers  to
..keep  pace with  the  growth  rare of
Optlon  11: High  surplus  liabilities.  So the  switch  to  a more
A  second way  to  control  short-term  risk  conservative  asser  mix  is not  a durable
of underfunding  is to  hold  a minimum  solution.  It  may be  of  help  for  the  short
surplus position  in  order to  absorb a fall  term,  but  it  will  undermine  the
in  asser  prices so that the  funding  ratio  long-term  solvency  position.
will  remain above  100 per cent.  The  Higher  contributions  may also close
Appendix  sets out  how  a minimum  the  solvency gap. However,  this  will
margin  can be determined.  Al1 Dutch  imply  very  high  additional  contributions;
pension funds  follow  this route  to  toa  high  to  be  of  help  in  real life.  To
control  solvency risk. The  Dutch  restore a 1  per cent-point  fall  in  the
supervisor also advocates this  approach.  funding  ratio  requires  for  a typical  Dutch
However,  the  authors have serious  fund  3  per  cent-point  to  5 per
doubts  about this approach, because it  cent-point  additional  contributions.  The
may harm  the  long-term  durability  of  recent de  cline  in  funding  ratio  of  Dutch
the  Dutch  pension scheme. The  main  funds range Erom 20-40  per cent.  Hence,
problem  is how  to  restore an empty  a short-term  recovering  of  the  solvency
buffer  after the fund  has been  hit  by a  position  by additional  contributions  is
serious fall  in  asser  prices or  by a high  not  feasible.
increase in  indexation  burden  due to  Sa, whenever  a pension fund
high  wage increases.  encounters a situation  of a severe funding
One  way to  restore an insufficient  gap, then  recovery  will  be difficult.  A
solvency position  is to  limit  the  exposure  situation  with  a problematic  solvency
to  mismatch  risk because this  will  lower  position  will  cause lots of difficulties.
the  required  minimum  size of the  First, the  supervisor will  force  the
solvency margin.  For instance, a switch  pension fund  to  take measures to  restore
Erom a risky  asser  mix  to  a more  solvency. Secondly, conflicts  may arise
conservative  asser  mix  will  result in  between  stakeholders as to  the  issue:
lower  solvency requirements.  Such a  who  has to  fin  the  funding  gap?
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Therefore  it  is better to  admit  in  advince  at all, and it  may lead to  a decrease in
that a pension fund  is not  able to  accrued benefits.  A  high  funding  ratio
guarantee that the  funding  ratio  wi1l  wi1l lead to  compensating indexation  or
remain  above  100 per cent. The  aim  of  even additional  indexation.  This
having  a sufficiendy  high  funding  ratio  risk-hearing  alternative  implies  a change
can be replaced by  an explicit  pension  from  a defmed  benefit  scheme to  a
deal.. This  is the  third  solution.  collective  defin~d  contribution  scheme.
In  real practice, it  is more  likely  that
the  risk-sharing rules are somewhere
Option  111:  Towards  an  explicit  between  these two  extremes.
pension  deal  Almost  all  Dutch  pension funds  lack
A  pension deal is explicit  when  there is  such an explicit  pension deal.  Usually  the
fu11  clarity  on the  three  aspects  below:  contract  on  risk hearing  is implicit  of
nature. This  may easily lead towards
1  Pension  plan:  What  is the  defmed  asymmetry  in  the  pension fund  policy  in
promise?  relation  to  the  funding  position.  In  the
2  Funding: What  are the  aims in  the  late  1990s, pension funds experienced  '
process of funding,  ie  what  is the  huge  surpluses that have been used for
aimed  return  on  investments, the  shortages in  contributions  and
aimed  contribution  rate and what  is  improvements  of the  pension benefits.
the  tolerated  level  of  mismatch risk?  After  the  dramatic  fall  in  stock prices in
3  Risk:  Which  of the  stakeholders and  recent years, most Dutch  pension funds
to  what  extent  take part  in  hearing  are struggling  with  underfunding.  The
risk?  supervisor insists on  a recovery  of  the
solvency  situation  in  the  short term;
As to  the  third  aspect, two  extreme  however,  stakeholders disagree on who
situations can be distinguished.  has to  par.  The  implicit  nature  of the
.contract may be hannful  to  the
Contributions  continuity  of the  contract.
The  sponsors bear all  risk, whereas the  However,  the  current  situation  can be
indexation  of a<;crued  benefits and the  regarded as a challenge to  reach a more
build-up  of  new benefits take place  explicIt  contract  of risk-sharing.  Such an
according  to  the  conditions  of the  explicit  pension deal wi1l prevent  policy
pension plan.  This  is a defmed  benefit  inettia  and  conflicts  between
scheme in  its pure farm.  The  participants  stakeholders, because it  is always clear
have fu11  certainty  as to  their  benefits.  who  has to  par,  when,  and to  what
The  contribution  rate is uncertain  extent,  in  a shortage situation.  It  should
depending  on  how  the funding  ratio  is  also be clear who  also wi1l benefit,
hit  by  economic  risks (asset  prices and  when,  and to  what  extent,  in  the  case of
wage arid price  inflation).  a large overfunding.6  Furthermore,  the
autho~  advocate that the  stakeholder
Indexation  who  ultimately  bears the funding  risk -
The  contribution  rate is fIXed at a certain  this  may be  either the  sponsor or the
level  (for example, the  actuarial cast  collectivity  of  participants  or a
price).  Risk  is absorbed by  adjusting the  combination  of  them  -has  to  decide
indexation  of the liabilities  of the  on the funding  policy.  The  risk-hearing
participants.  A  low  funding  ratio  wi1l  stakeholder is then  able to  relate the
imply  a low  indexation  or no  indexation  funding  policy  to  rus preferences.
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Table 4:  Seven critical questions tor an explicit pension deal?
Assets'  Liabilities
5.  What is the risk-tree asset mix that  1.  What is the  benetit promise?
provide a perfect match with liabilities?  2.  What is the value ot detined benetits?
6.  Should pension fund  undertake asset mix
policy risk?
7.  Should the plan undertake active
management risk?
Surplus
3.  What is the target tunding ratio?
4.  How are balance sheet surpluses and
losses allocated between stakeholders?
Who owns the surplus on termination?
An  explicit  pension  deal  may  also  yean. The 3 per cent assumption  may indeed be
imply  a  completely  different  role  for  the  see~  as quite high.. However, ~ lower  (or higher)
eqwty  premIum wiJl have no Impact on the
SUpervISOr.  Whenever  an  explicIt  pensIon  argument of the paper.
deal  is  in  force,  the  supervisor  has  to  4  This 9"/0  is calculated  with  the following expression:
check  that  the  execution  of  the  pension  U!;.bili.",  = D* UW  + Uw...,.  The term D  represents  the
...duration  of the laibilities, the term Uw  stands  for the
fund  IS In  accordance  Wlth  the  content  risk (standard  deviation) in  the real rate of interst
of  the  deal.  There  is  no  langer  a  need  to  and Uwage  for the risk in wage growth.  The volatility
formulate  criteria  as to  the  minimum  in  the expected  real rate of interest rate is quite low
.."  and it  bas  been set equal to 0.4 per cent. Let
margIn.  It  IS the  ulttmate  nsk-bearer  who  duration be equal to  17.5 yean (this is more or less
has  to  decide  on  the  issue  of  aimed  the duration of a typical Dutch pension fund with
funding  ratio.  indexed liabilities. The volatily in wage growth is set
Anib h h d E 7  equal to 2 per cent. This leads  to  a volatility  in
ac  ts  eer  an  zra  suggest  a  liabilities of 9% (=17.5*0.4%  + 2%).
pro  gramme  of  questions  to  arrive  at  an  5  The Dutch supervisor  is currendy developing a
explicit  pension  deal.  Table  4  is  a  revised  framework. Fair value and risk analysis  are
representation  of  their  proposal.  These  prominent features  .of the new model. Elabor:ation  of
..methods  and techniques,  as weIl as the def=g  of
questtons  may  be  of  help  to  clanfy  the  standards  wiJl take place within  the next few yean.
main  topics  in  the  pension  fund  The supervisor,  the 'Pensioen- &  Verzekeringskamer'
arrangement.  If  a  pension  fund  is  going  (pensions  and insurance  supervisory  authority of the
.Netherlands)  bas  recendy published the basic
to  create  value  for  lts  stakeholders,  the  principles for this new framework, named: the
fiduciary  of  the  fund  must  actually  be  Financial Testing  Framework. See
clear  as  to  what  the  pension  promise  is  http://www.pvk.nl/engels/index~eneral.html.
d h th . k b 6  The deal rnay also be important to  check -at  least
an  w  0  e  ns  -earers  are.  . on an ex ante  basIS  -that  the advantages  of
participation are on balance  higher than the
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~  I  lniti~l  ~ding  ratio  I
Figure 3:  Probability  distribution  funding  ratio end of year T
9  This fonnu1a  does  not take  into account  the effect  shortfall  risk8  a  after  a period  of  T  years
of the increment  of the funding  ratio due  to the  . bI . Thi h .
t d turn .. tI 'al funding tl-- 100."  IS acce pta  e  as a maX1mum.  s c  olce expec  e  exces  re  : llU  ra 0 -7.
+  margin  -/-  increment  of excess  return.  However,  is  detemrinative  of  the  initial  funding
the Jatter  tenn can  be taken  to be zero,  for two  ratio  or  the  required  solvency  margin.
reasons:  in case  the actual  funding  ratio is equal  to Th '  . ti'al fu din ti. b h --_
al fu din . th th - f h elm  n  g  ra  0  can  e t  e llUtI  n  g ratio,  en  e mcrement  0 te.  .
funding  ratio is fxeely  available  and  can  for instance  detenmned  by  means  of  the  followmg
be used  for premium  reduction  or pension  formula,9  where  the  volatility  in  the
improvement.  funding  ratio  increases  in  time
proportionally  to  the  square  root  of  the
A d " M "" I forecast  period  T: ppen  IX:  Immum so vency
margin I .. al fu din .
mtI  n  g ratio
This  paper  has discussed  the  holding  of  a  =  100% +  margin
minimum  solvency  margin  as one  war  to  =  100%  +  VT*a  *z
mrn  a
control  short  term  risk  of underfunding.
Here  me  minimum  solvency  margin  in  a  where:
fair  value  context  is  derived.
The  funding  ratio  T  years  Erom  now  T  =  forecast  period
is  uncertain  and  can  be  described  on  the  <Tmrn  =  mismatch  risk  (=standard
basis  of  a  probability  distribution.  In  the  deviation  of  extra  return
short  term  the  probability  distribution  relative  to  the  liabilities)
can  be  characterised  as a normal  Za =  number  of  standard  deviations
distribution.  The  spread  in  the  away  Erom  the  average,  given
distribution  is  mainly  detemrined  by  the  the  accepted  shortfall  risk  a
mismatch  risk.  The  mismatch  risk  is  nil  if
all  the  resources  of  a given  fund  are  The  above  can  be  illustrated  by  Figure  3.
invested  in  indexed  bonds.  The  addition  Now,  with  alternative  values  taken  for
of  regular  honds  and  shares results  in  T,  a  and  <Tmrn  the  size  of  the  required
more  excess  return,  but  at the  same  time  margin  can  be  detemrined  for  the
in  a  higher  mismatch  risk  as well.  The  pension  fund  presented  in  the  case study
crucial  issue  now  is  the  question  which  above.
@ Henry Stewart Publications 1478-5315 (2003)  Vol.  8, 3, 222-234 Pensions  233
IPonds  and Quix
Table 5:  Minimum  solvency  margin  for different  combinations  of horizon  (T)  and probability  of underfunding
a, for a given mix of 50% shares  and 50% long-term  bonds
Margin  Period T  Probability a (.%)  Mismatch risk r,-
16..41  10  12.9
21.2  1  5  12.9
29.9  1  12.9
38.8  0.1  12.9
28.5  10;0  12,9
36.7  3  5  12.9
51.9  3  1  12.9
672 301 12 " 9 '..  ..
36.8  5  10  12.9
47.4  5  5  12.9
66.9  5  1  12.9
86.8  5  0.1  12.9
Table  6:  Minimum  solvency  margin  for  different  mixes,  with  a  horizon  of  three  years  and  a 5%  probability  of
underfunding
Margin  ;  Period T;  ;  Probability a  (%)  Mismatch risk r,-  Mix stocks/bonds
35.2  3  5  12.3  40/60
36.7  3  5  12.9  50/50
38.8  3  5  12.6  60/40
41.1  3  5  14.4  30nO
Three  variants  as regards  to  the  calculated,  on  the  basis  of  an  investment
horizon  are  distinguished:  portfolio,  which  is made  up  of  50  per
cent  equities  and  50  per  cent  long-tenn
T  =  1  (in  line  with  the  new  solvency  bonds.  This  mix  gives  a  short-tenn
assessment of  Pension  and  mismatch  risk  of  12.9  per  cent.  The
Insurance  Chamber);  results  of  these  calculations  are  presented
T  =  3  in  Table  5.  It  can  be  seen  that  the
T  =  5  margin  increases  accordingly  as the
...period  becomes  langer.  This  is  due  to
For  the  probability  of  underfunding  a,  the  accumulation  of  uncertainty  as the
10  per  cent,  5  per  cent,  1  per  cent  and  horizon  is  extended.  The  margin
0.1  per  cent  are  chosen.  On  the  basis  of  becomes  larger  as the  allowable
these  values,  the  following  values  for  z  probability  of  underfunding  becomes
are  obtained:  smaller.
Table  6  shows  the  effect  of  variants  in
a  (%)  Za  the  investment  mix  on  the  margin.  The
mix  is  determinative  of  the  level  of  the
10  1.28  mismatch  risk.  The  calculations  have
5  1.65  been  clone  for  a  combination  of  a
1  2.33  horizon  of  three  years  and  5  per  cent  as
0.1  3.02  the  acceptable  probability  of
underfunding.  The  figures  in  Table  5
For  the  various  combinations  of  T  and  a  show  the  increase  of  the  margin  at a
the  required  solvency  margin  is  higher  mismatch  risk.
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